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Modernity Contextualises New 







On 30 July 2001, the four-volume 1200 page report of New Zealand’s Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification (RCGM) was released. This was timely 
for the government; it was soon to legislate on its expiring one-year voluntary 
moratorium on the environmental releases of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), both for field trials and commercial applications. Despite strong 
public opposition to genetic engineering (GE), the RCGM findings tended 
to support the ongoing development of GE in Aotearoa/New Zealand,1  and 
recommended the recommencement of GM field trials and planning for 
GMO releases.
 The findings met with mixed reactions. Some proponents of biotechnology, 
such as Brian Arnst, the public relations manager for Monsanto NZ, 
suggested that they were as expected.2  Others from a diverse range of 
public interest groups were surprised, and, like the majority of New 
Zealanders, disappointed. Soon after the report’s release, one of the largest 
marches against genetic engineering in western countries to date occurred 
in Auckland. The estimated 10,000 strong ‘Keep New Zealand GE Free’ 
rally was awash with costumes, placards and metaphors, such as ‘Proud 
to be GE free’, ‘Tomatoes not Frog-atoes!’, ‘Say NO to Pigato’, ‘$top Life 
Patents – You are Next!’, ‘Progress at What Cost? – Is this to be the Last 
GE-free Spring Ever?’, ‘Do something to STOP GM Madness!’3 
 Those placards signalled some of the pertinent issues associated with 
genetic engineering. They include, but are not restricted to: release into the 
environment of GE organisms; the safety of GM foods; consumer choice 
and right to know; the private ownership of genetic material through 
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intellectual property rights; the subsequent convergence of public and private 
research; increasing control of agri-food production and seed ownership 
by agribusiness and biotech conglomerates; the very desirability of genetic 
engineering vis-à-vis other modes of production; the ‘biocolonisation’ of 
nature to align it to a techno-industrial milieu; or, the bioprospecting of 
indigenous knowledge.4 
 Compounding public consternation was that the controversial RCGM 
findings had closely followed a Tasmanian parliamentary select committee’s 
findings on GM. The Tasmanian recommendations contrasted with those 
of the RCGM; they supported a continuation of the Tasmanian GM crop 
release moratorium, and also expressed a strong desire to declare Tasmania 
GM-free. One reason was a desire to position Tasmania favourably for 
emergent global markets demanding ‘GM-free’ produce. Similarly, many 
environmental, Maori, religious, health and organic orientated groups had 
expressed such preferences to the RCGM for Aotearoa/New Zealand’s 
future.5 
 Consequently, many Aotearoa/New Zealand environmental groups 
perceived the RCGM findings to be advocating for genetic engineering. 
Green Party co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons stated, ‘. . . we just couldn’t 
see how they [the RCGM] could come to those conclusions on the basis 
of what they heard’.6  Prior to the findings, many had been confident that 
the Royal Commission would result in a continued moratorium on GMO 
releases. Greenpeace New Zealand’s GE campaigner Annette Cotter stated, 
‘. . . because of the strong public opposition and that kind of thing, the 
Commission is very unlikely to come up with a policy that says go for 
it’.7 
 Numerous public demonstrations, GM-free zones declared across the 
country, and public opinion polls tended to support the optimistic biocritics’ 
pronouncements. This was further evidenced by the high number of public 
submissions to the RCGM, either strongly against, or tending to be against, 
GM (9,998 – 92% – of the 10,861 submissions). By way of contrast, a recent 
and highly publicised Australian Senate inquiry into genetic engineering 
attracted only 109 submissions, of which about 40 were from the public.8  
Perhaps a reason for the difference in the number of submissions to each 
inquiry is a perception that Royal Commissions are independent inquiries, 
whereas parliamentary inquiries are overtly conducted by politicians.9  More 
pointedly, the many submissions to the RCGM represented a significant 
mobilisation of public protest in New Zealand. Indeed, apart from mass 
mobilisations of Asian peasant movements against genetic engineering,10  
in the western world the New Zealand mobilisation appears to have been 
eclipsed only by the degree of activism in the vigorous United Kingdom 
campaign.11  Yet, despite the strong public opposition in Aotearoa/New 
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Zealand, the RCGM made clear its intent to ignore it: ‘We wish to stress 
. . . that the terms of reference did not direct us to conduct our enquiry 
as if it were a referendum’.12 
 There was already a precedent across the Tasman in setting terms of 
reference to nullify public opposition to GE. Australia’s first inquiry into 
genetic engineering was convened by the Federal Government’s House of 
Representatives in 1992. In that instance the terms of reference (set by the 
Minister for Industry, Science and Technology) included an a priori and 
unqualified acceptance of the benefits of recombinant-DNA work. This 
effectively placed any opposition to genetic engineering, whether expressed 
in submissions or at hearings, outside the boundaries of the inquiry. 
Subsequently, although 35% of the submissions (those from the public) 
advocated an immediate halt to GE work in Australia, this public preference 
went unreported when the inquiry’s findings were tabled.13 
 This case illustrates how inquiries can act as forms of power/knowledge to 
confine or defuse debates.14  Ashforth advances three reasons why inquiries, 
such as those into genetic engineering in Aotearoa/New Zealand and 
Australia, are held, and why they can arrive at outcomes contradictory to 
well-stated public preferences. They may be conducted: firstly, to appease the 
discontent of public interest groups with the power to destabilise industrial 
development programmes supported by the state; secondly, to address the 
limitation of resources within the bureaucracy to face a pressing and complex 
problem; thirdly, to maximise gains for key interests. Here, the last would 
refer to genetic engineering interests.15 
 It has also been suggested that such inquiries may represent ‘. . . a system 
of intellectual collusion whereby selected . . . intelligentsia transmit forms of 
knowledge into political practices. The effect of this process is to replenish 
official arguments with both established and novel modes of knowing and 
forms of reasoning.’16  For example, the Australian House of Representatives 
inquiry’s report – Genetic Manipulation: The Threat or the Glory? – was 
used effectively for some time by bioproponents as a ‘persuasive’ text 
to popularise genetic engineering as an ‘inevitable’ and highly desirable 
social and natural ‘reality’. This served to strengthen the bioscientific 
discourse as dominant vis-à-vis the discourse of biocritics, especially 
environmentalists.17  Likewise, in Aotearoa/New Zealand, bioproponents 
have begun to position the RCGM report as a legitimising text for the 
future. In the words of Business New Zealand’s chief executive Simon 
Carlaw: ‘The Royal Commission . . . appears to have taken a cautious step 
that offers the prospect of a sensible way forward’.18  Similarly, Federated 
Farmers of New Zealand (Inc) President, Alistair Polson, indicated: ‘We 
agree with the Royal Commission’s conclusion that it would be unwise to 
turn our backs on the potential advantages on offer but we must proceed 
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carefully, minimising and managing risks’.19  This intimation by business 
and conventional farmers of support for ‘going forward with GE’ ignored 
that the Commission’s report was not legally binding, and that its findings 
faced widespread public dissent.
 In this paper, we explore the negotiation of the RCGM process and its 
implied advocacy for GE against the background of public disapproval for 
GM, especially that of environmentalists. Our interest in the latter arises 
from our position in the debate, defined as a position of the third space of 
critical engagement.20  In short, we adopt an environmental public-interest 
stance and straddle the so-called academic-activist divide.21  A key aim is to 
investigate some of the constraints placed on environmentalist groups when 
they attempted to voice their objection to GE through the RCGM. A relevant 
observation that informs our view is that of Arne Naess: ‘In environmental 
conflicts, it is . . . important to map out the power structures relevant in 
pushing the decisions and determining the different stages in [environmental] 
conflict’.22  Obviously, such analysis is needed in order to understand, and 
to participate effectively in, the policy process.
 To introduce our subject, we background the composition and terms of 
reference of the Royal Commission. We then deconstruct (or unpack) the 
RCGM as a multidimensional discourse involving the development and role 
of established and novel modes of knowing and forms of reasoning. An 
integral part of this is exploration of the intersection of the Commission’s 
gathering and analysis of the submissions, as well as some of its key findings 
relevant to environmentalists.
Background
Parallel to the intense and escalating international debate about genetic 
engineering over the last decade, the public of Aotearoa/New Zealand 
also demonstrated its wariness of the hype surrounding a GM future. In 
1990, a comprehensive survey undertaken by New Zealand’s Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research found that 56% of the public had 
concerns about the applications of genetic engineering.23  Since then, with 
environmental, consumer, Maori and other public interest groups more 
actively engaged with the debate, and with substantially more media 
coverage, public concerns over GE have grown. So much so, that genetic 
engineering became a ‘hot’ issue in the 1999 national elections, with the 
Green Party calling for a Royal Commission in its electoral campaign. 
The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification was eventually established 
by the Labour-Alliance coalition government, and was constituted on 8 
May 2000.
 The appointed members of the Royal Commission were the Right 
Honourable Sir Thomas Eichelbaum (Chief Justice of New Zealand from 
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1989 to 1999); Jacqueline Allen (a general practitioner in South Auckland 
with community and Maori health expertise); Dr Jean Fleming (a biochemist 
and molecular reproduction and endocrinology researcher); and the Right 
Reverend Richard Randerson (Bishop of the Anglican Church).24  The 
Commission was given just over a year, later extended by two months (until 
27 July 2001), to report its recommendations to the government.
 The terms of the Commission’s warrant were: ‘. . . to receive representations 
upon, inquire into, investigate, and report upon the following matters:
1. the strategic options available to enable New Zealand to address, now 
and in the future, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, 
and products; and
2. any changes considered desirable to the current legislative, regulatory, 
policy, or institutional arrangements for addressing, in New Zealand, 
genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products.’25 
The Commission’s investigation was to be based on evidence gathered 
from public meetings, written submissions from the public, hui with 
Maori (meetings with the indigenous peoples), and from written and oral 
submissions from groups deemed ‘interested persons’ (IP). To gain IP status 
a group must have proved that it had an ‘. . . an interest in the Inquiry apart 
from any interest in common with the public’.26 
The Theoretical Context
Many environmental discourses exist today – such as those of deep ecology, 
social ecology, eco-feminism, or eco-technological transformation – that 
argue that industrial society is now engaged in a crisis of perception with 
regard to society-technology-nature relationships. Some, like Fritjof Capra 
– who follows in the Romantic tradition and suggests a deep ecology science 
– assert we are already in a period of paradigm shift from dry to deep green 
values.27  Although these views inform our position, and also informed many 
of the environmentalist submissions to the RCGM, for our critical approach 
of discourse analysis (which we discuss later) Ulrich Beck’s concept of a 
risk society provides a useful frame of reference.28 
 Beck’s analysis of environmental conflicts is relevant to contemporary 
societal transition and fluidly embraces the controversy over genetic 
modification and the consequential RCGM. Beck conceptualises 
three periods of societal transition: modernity; second modernity and 
reflexive modernisation (risk society). Modernity relates to the period of 
industrialisation. Second modernity, the phase we are currently in, forms 
the transitional stage between industrial society and reflexive modernity. 
The last is an alternative modernity – an ‘ideal type’ future – in which 
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society comprehensively and proactively reflects and addresses the 
processes, ideals, and failings, of modernity.
 The contemporary importance of these phases relates to a shift of focus 
from industrial society’s preoccupation with the production of material 
goods to a parallel focus on the production or generation of risks. The 
current transitional period to risk society is one where the ideologies and 
practices of modernity – for example, progress, economic growth, and 
western science and technology – are under intense paradigmatic challenge 
for their perceived role in escalating environmental and social problems, 
and for not having adequate critical facilities to address them.29  In this 
contested terrain, genetic engineering has become a perceived mega-
technological risk. Indeed, the scope of issues and protests surrounding 
GM exemplifies the upheaval found in the transitional period between 
modernity and reflexive modernisation.
 In seeking open public debate, a public inquiry would appear to offer 
not only an opportunity to explore contentious issues but also a forum to 
reflect upon the processes that give rise to them. Critical reflection upon 
the processes of modernity and their use in risk society is, to reiterate, a 
key element of moving into reflexive modernity. Without willing, adequate 
and open consideration of the failures of modernist ideals and practices, 
attempts to effectively address new, second modernity, globe-threatening 
risks will in all likelihood be rendered impotent.
 Discourse analysis offers a key way to explore and reflect upon the 
negotiation of the GE debate through the RCGM – both a policy process, and 
a text shaping the future process of policy. A useful definition of ‘discourse’ 
is: ‘a framework that includes whole sets of ideas, words, concepts, and 
practices. Discourses are the general context in which ideas take on a 
specific meaning and inform particular practices. A discourse is a set of 
widely held ideas that a society relies on to make sense of the world, a set 
of general beliefs about the nature of reality.’30 
 The use of discourse analysis allows us to analyse language and 
its structure to investigate social power relations. The application of 
Fairclough’s multi-dimensional discourse analysis model supports the notion 
of modernist ideals constituting a central element of the RCGM discourse.31  
Fairclough views discourse as comprising three concurrent elements: the 
social context; the discursive field; and the text. The first of these is the 
social context, in which hegemonic (dominant and ‘naturalised’) power 
relations are contested. Within this paper we are exploring the hegemony 
of modernist ideals as the social context of the RCGM. Within the social 
context lies the discursive practice where the production and distribution 
of information is analysed. This element here consists of the ways in 
which the RCGM gathered and analysed the submissions, which arguably 
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‘coloured’ its report. Finally, in the third element of Fairclough’s model 
lies the text, which in the case of the RCGM we have nominated as its 
findings. These findings are deconstructed to form the final constitutive 
part of our discourse analysis of the RCGM.
 Hegemony describes unequal power relations that reside in unstable but 
constant conditions of equilibrium built on the subordination of groups 
and classes. The latter continuously struggle against dominant actors who 
are positioned best to shape society and its technological base and form.32  
Thus, the negotiation over genetic engineering is comprised of a complex 
struggle of competing as well as contiguous or shared interests found in 
contesting policy networks and communities. At any one time and in any 
particular domain – such as the RCGM – complementary and contradictory 
linkages of power (for example, reproduction of domination, resistance, 
challenge, transformation) are engaged, dependent on the nature and success 
of competitive power strategies. From such engagement of social power, as 
currently found over genetic engineering in Aotearoa/New Zealand (and 
elsewhere), the technological trajectories and modes of production for the 
future are shaped. The practices of argument – discursive practices – form 
a central mode of influence in this engagement and contestation.
 When contestation continues, hegemony can never be complete, and 
resistance and transformational discourses that challenge hegemonic 
discourses have a capability to undermine and/or to ‘open up’ entrenched 
power structures, and thus to delegitimise and disempower them. In response, 
actors operating from domains of structural (or dominant organisational) 
power embellish existing strategies of hegemony. As Bruno Latour said, 
‘Technoscience is war . . . Its object is domination and its methods involve 
the mobilization of allies, their multiplication and their drilling, their 
strategic and forceful juxtaposition to the enemy.’33  A central strategic ploy 
found in contestations over technoscience, such as genetic engineering, is 
where dominant actors strive to control rules of passage in the terrain.34  
In this context, the RCGM undergoes a shift from its literal representation 
as a democratic and independent avenue of public inquiry to representation 
as a conduit of power that requires certain rules of passage. This latter 
representation is the object of our analysis. Specifically, we are exploring 
the discourse and discursive practices of the RCGM as frameworks of 
power, which set and controlled rules of passage that advantaged some and 
disadvantaged others.
The Social Context
The European scientific revolution of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, 
culminating in the Enlightenment closely followed by the industrial 
revolution, ushered in modernity.35  A key element of modernity was the 
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transformation of structures of knowledge. Reliance on tradition (religion) 
and organicism as the foundation of knowledge was replaced by a new 
dependence on rationality, ‘objectivity’, and an ‘atomistic’ portrayal of 
reality, in which humans were repositioned as ‘context-independent’ 
‘masters’ of nature. The new worldview was underpinned by a belief in 
unlimited progress facilitated by modern science and technology. This 
viewpoint, expounded especially by thinkers such as Bacon, Descartes and 
Newton, saw nature as a ‘machine’, the parts of which could be manipulated 
and exploited for human benefit.36 Genetic engineering represents a sublime 
contemporary expression of this view. ‘Genes’ are ‘decoded’ as ‘parts of 
the DNA alphabet’, or as ‘bits of information’ that can be ‘reshuffled’ or 
‘restacked’ in the new genomic ‘book of life’. In short, the secular and 
mechanistic cosmology of Enlightenment science, and its quantitative 
method and laboratory tools, such as the microscope, ‘abstracted, reduced 
and organised’ nature’s complexity into various atomistic functions or 
aspects according to universalistic mathematical laws and relations. Science 
became the key to ‘subduing and controlling’ nature for collective human 
purpose.
 At the same time, the holistic worldview of a ‘living nature’ that deserved 
a responsible and caring human relationship became oppressed. Likewise, the 
early nature movement, coined as the Romantic movement, which emerged 
in the late eighteenth century to advocate the concepts of spiritual unity 
with nature and organism (later known as vitalism) and which rejected 
rationalism and reductionism,37  became marginalised.
 It was not until nearly two centuries later, in the 1960s and 1970s, that 
a more powerful nature movement emerged to contest modernist principles. 
The realist narrative (positivism) that modern science is the one truth to 
understanding, and the basis of relating to, nature became particularly 
contested by the emergence of the social responsibility of science movement, 
the radical environmental movement, and more recently by postmodernist 
and feminist scholars.
 In contesting modernity, these critiques perceive rationality as embedded 
within culture, and conversely, that rationality shapes culture.38  Restivo, 
amongst others, relates how the scientific revolution – based on the 
oppression of women, minorities and labourers, and the exploitation of 
human and nonhuman ‘resources’ – developed from social and cultural 
circumstances.39  Knowledge was intimately related to power structures 
found in politics, commerce, and the military, as it still is today. The 
scientific revolution was not just an intellectual revolution but also an 
organisational and institutional revolution; a point Restivo believes is not 
widely understood. Harding describes the relationship between knowledge 
and institutional power as the ‘order of society’.40  These notions help 
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contextualise the centrality of modernity to any critical discussion of the 
RCGM. Modernist principles that form the implicit assumptions of what 
appears as ‘natural’ and ‘given’ have been widely disseminated and adopted 
in our society, and thus can be considered hegemonic. Other ways of 
knowing have been marginalised, and continue to be marginalised, through 
many forms of power/knowledge relations that shape public discourse about 
our relationship to nature.41  A central example is the notion of ‘sustainable 
development’; a concept that Coutinho argues has as a central intent, the 
‘disqualification of catastrophist or otherwise radical discourses on the 
relation between society and the environment’.42 
 Environmental groups, in contesting the genetic engineering debate 
through the RCGM, were thus contesting, implicitly or explicitly, 
assumptions of modernity. Cozzens and Woodhouse suggest that within the 
broader texture of the environmental movement many would be unaware 
that their contestation of GM could be considered as epistemological 
and/or ontological.43  Yet, many environmental groups may progress from 
addressing the particular issues that triggered their environmental concern 
to epistemological and/or ontological concerns. For example, those who 
began campaigning on visible pollution may also develop a critique of 
systems of knowledge when their experiences of visible pollution are 
discounted in favour of contradicting ‘scientific evidence’. Likewise, in 
campaigning against genetic engineering those who began by expressing 
a moral aversion to tampering with the genetic ‘code’ may, upon being 
challenged by scientific objection, turn their attention to examining the 
underlying scientific worldview in more detail.44  Degrees of awareness thus 
vary so that environmental and/or social critiques may also be critiques of 
modernity. This is especially the case among those categorised as ‘light 
greens’, ‘reform greens’, or ‘shallow greens’. By way of contrast, ‘deep 
greens’ or radical environmentalists, the women’s health movement, and 
the alternative health movement, possess more sophisticated critiques of 
knowledge/power, and are thus more explicit in their critiques of hegemony 
and modernist discourses.
 In addition to modernist principles manifesting themselves as hegemonic 
through the establishment of modernist knowledge systems, hegemony 
is also found in the privileging of modernist forms of reasoning. For 
example, with the Cartesian separation of the ‘rational’ from other forms of 
reasoning during the scientific revolution,45  science became entrenched as the 
discourse of public life in official and governmental texts. With the scientific 
dominating, romantic discourses became delegated to the ‘private’ sphere 
as inferior forms of reasoning unsuitable for public decision-making.
 Thus, in addressing hegemonic knowledge systems, environmental groups 
are often confronted with the rational (public): romantic (private) discourse 
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split brought about by modernity. Environmental problems are thus usually 
framed as ‘objective’ problems, best addressed by ‘rational’ or ‘sound’ 
science. Although it is accepted that some environmental issues have only 
become apparent through science (such as the ‘hole’ in the ozone layer), 
a narrow reliance on science acts to distort perceptions of environmental 
problems as being unconnected to each other, and also from social and 
economic conditions. Inadequate solutions most often result.46  Social and 
cultural concerns become marginalised, including those about ethics, 
ecosocial justice and alternative societal futures. Public attention is shifted 
away from the contestation of dominant discourses.47  Such rationalisation of 
debate on environmental issues, Grove-White suggests,48  serves the interests 
of governments keen to enframe debate in politically ‘neutral’ terms, which, 
in turn, acts to ‘absorb’ dissent.
 With regard to genetic engineering, debate rationalisation has been 
proactively crafted internationally, especially through forums in the United 
Kingdom and United States.49  With regard to the containment of open debate 
in Australia, Hindmarsh identified that process as the ‘mobilisation of bias’.50  
Containment of debate, Loge asserts, is a central strategy of the discourse 
of biotechnology or ‘biospeak’, as he has nominated it.51  Two ‘grammars’ 
comprise biospeak: ‘technologised’ and ‘mythologised’. ‘Technologised’ refers 
to the ‘protected’ language or jargon of technoscience, which acts to exclude 
the public through technoscience illiteracy and reinforce the socially insulated 
position of the techno-elite. As a strategy of technicalisation its aim is thus 
to monopolise power through scientific or expert authority.52  This is achieved 
by assigning only ‘scientific’ or ‘technical’ meanings to (bio)technology 
issues. Discussions of the issues are only considered legitimate where they 
fit ‘within the frame of science’.53 
 In this context, it is notable that three of the four Commissioners 
conducting the RCGM were from a legal or scientific background, including 
one with a genetic engineering background. The other Commissioner was 
from the Anglican Church, which adopts primarily an anthropocentric 
cosmological position largely uncritical of genetic engineering, with 
some exceptions in the human domain. While this does not prescribe 
a particular perspective on GE by any of the Commissioners, it does 
suggest that people from these backgrounds would be predisposed to 
favour modernist disciplines in epistemology and ontology. Certainly, if 
environmental positions were held, the Commissioner’s backgrounds would 
suggest only shallow environmental worldviews, are incrementalist and 
reform-focused and working within modernist principles. In selecting the 
four Commissioners, the Minister for the Environment, the Hon Marian 
Hobbs, stated: ‘The science and medical community are well represented 
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on the Commission’.54  It is significant that while the science and medical 
communities were well represented the environmental community was 
not.
 In turn, the ‘mythologised’ grammar of biospeak refers to ‘the literal 
application of the metaphor’, which strives to enrol ‘allies’ to a GM 
futurenatural. For example: ‘The living world can now be viewed as a vast 
Lego kit inviting combination, hybridisation and continual rebuilding’.55  
Nature can be reordered through ‘breaking’ and ‘redesigning’ the ‘DNA 
code’. The key to the reordering of nature is ‘the gene’ cast as ‘master 
molecule’. This also tends to reinforce hierarchical and fractured notions 
of nature, as well as upholding the model of class capitalism through the 
portrayal of the gene as higher than the cell or organisms, or as ‘factory 
foreman’ in the ‘production line of proteins’.56  Moral and scientific discourses 
combine where the gene is also portrayed as ‘saviour’ to feed the hungry 
of the world, and as ‘the key to controlling our biological destiny’ so that 
we may live longer, free of disease, defects, or imperfection. A central 
message to critics is that, by delaying such technical progress, society risks 
failing to develop the necessary technology to achieve a bio-utopia.57  To 
counter GM activists, ecological discourses are appropriated to portray GM 
foods as ‘natural’, ‘clean, ‘green’, ‘safe’, ‘environmentally-friendly’, and even 
‘organic’. Such rhetorical devices thus attempt to paint a winning picture of 
GM. They aim to ‘persuade’.
 In response, environmental activists contest the terrain in many ways. A 
popular strategy is the attempt to delegitimise GE in the public domain by 
also painting metaphorical landscapes of persuasion. Pollution metaphors 
aim to stigmatise genetic engineering as ‘genetic contamination’ through 
gene flow from GM crops to non-GM crops via cross-pollination,58  and 
thus to catalyse public debate about future choices about nature and society, 
and about food labelling. Another key metaphor employed is ‘GM foods 
as Frankenfoods’, which attempts to demonise GM as a ‘technological 
monster out of control’, and as ‘unaccountable’. Such representation evokes 
responses from many people with deep ethical and moral concerns about 
scientific experimentation. Through this approach, biocritics employ romantic 
arguments about scientific responsibility, as well as about care for nature.
 A second popular strategy of contestation is through attempts to harness 
science to argue environmental issues, and thus to meet agents of modernity 
‘on their own ground’, the ‘legitimate’ ground. This was the strategy of 
the peak environmental groups Green Alliance and Greenpeace during the 
United Kingdom GM debate. It tends to accept the dominant discourse of 
‘sound science’ as pre-eminent in offering the solution for the environmental 
problems of GM. In turn, this tends to accept the substance and terms of 
debate as set by the proponents as being pre-eminent within modernist 
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technical discourse, for example, biophysical risks (or the degree of safety of 
releasing GMOs into the environment).59  But in accepting scientific reasoning 
as pre-eminent, these groups uphold the rational/public and romantic/private 
discourse split, and are, in any case, usually out-manoeuvred in the terrain 
of contestation.
 A lesser-adopted avenue for environmental groups is to attempt to straddle 
the rational/public: romantic/private discourse split. This was demonstrated 
in some of the submissions to the RCGM, yet the attempt was hampered by 
the RCGM’s set rules of passage for its process and analysis, as expressed, 
in the first instance, through the submission template.
The Submission Template
In submissions to the RCGM, all Interested Persons (IPs) were required to 
present their arguments within a 16-question template.60  Unlike the normative 
GM debate rationalisation, the RCGM template invited discussion on the non-
physical aspects of GM as follows: ‘B(j) the main areas of public interest in 
genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products, including 
those related to . . . (iv) cultural and ethical concerns’.61 
 Despite the invitation to discuss broader concerns, which extended the 
rational to include the romantic, the template posed obstacles to actually 
extending the discourse. This was because the Commission ruled that all 
answers were to ‘stand alone’; in other words, a parts approach was employed, 
an elemental condition of the epistemology of modernity. In setting this 
condition the Commission constrained those submitting, denying them the 
opportunity to contextualise adequately their opposition to, or concerns 
about, GM within the framework of their worldview.
 Noam Chomsky has defined a parallel to this ‘concision’ in the world 
of mainstream media interviewing.62  This is where interviewees have to fit 
their answers to interview questions into ‘bites’, sandwiched between the 
advertisements. This, Chomsky explains, means that interviewees have to 
conform to mainstream thought in order to get their message across quickly 
and ‘appropriately’ to a mass media audience. Obviously this constrains 
answers that need contextualisation through perhaps long or complex 
explanation.
 Adequate licence for contextualisation would have enabled environmental 
groups to better explain the assumptions and values underpinning their 
submissions, and to thus challenge more effectively the (hegemonic) values 
and assumptions of the RCGM’s social context of modernity. Alternative 
expressions about GM would then, arguably, have received more consideration 
in the Commission’s deliberations; certainly more equity to express 
representative opinion within argument would have resulted. The following 
passage, taken from the executive summary of the Green Party’s submission, 
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illustrates this point: ‘It would not have been our preference to organise 
our submission in this way . . . We have had to put the explanation of our 
own philosophy under “public interest” because it is the only heading that 
mentions ethics.’63 
 Further difficulty in answering questions, especially when one has an 
alternative worldview to ‘the dominant one,’ was explained by Berylla of 
the Environment Conservation Organisation (ECO): ‘I think the way the 
Commission wanted information formatted into categories made it difficult 
to make a coherent submission, especially for groups like ECO that were 
taking an ecosystems approach. We see everything as affecting everything 
else. We did not want to break down our responses into the categories 
they had designated’.64  It would appear that environmental groups would 
have benefited from an alternative to the template, one in which they 
could have ‘built’ an argument explaining their worldview before providing 
contextualised responses to the RCGM’s questions.
Design and Process
Environmental groups concerns about the reductionist methodology of ‘stand 
alone’ template answers were subsequently heightened by apprehension that 
a reductionist approach would also be used for the Commission’s analysis 
of the submissions. Environmentalists were anxious about the possibility 
that summaries, or generalised compressions, of their responses on each 
question would be given to the Commissioners to deliberate. If this were 
done, it would compromise, and thus misrepresent, the diversity of opinions 
and ecological worldviews held amongst environmental groups.
 The process that eventuated, although slightly different to that envisaged 
by critics, was still compromising, and thus misrepresentational. Although 
each IP submission was individually summarised, all were collated into 
an IP report, which was used as a ‘. . . working document to assist the 
Commissioners in their deliberations on evidence presented’.65  As both 
a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the submissions: ‘The approach 
adopted for the summary and analysis of submissions by Interested Persons 
was therefore largely dictated by the format in which the evidence was 
presented (i.e., the specific Warrant items) and by the perceived requirements 
of the Commissioners’.66  The result of this process was to restrict further 
the desire of some environmental groups to express their opposition to GM 
within their respective worldviews. This further distorted and compromised 
environmentalist arguments and perspectives.
Text: Analysing the Findings
Despite the difficulties that faced the IPs in expressing their specific 
worldviews within the submission template, the RCGM did include some 
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nominal discussion of worldviews in its findings. In the 25 pages devoted 
to cultural, ethical and spiritual issues the RCGM stated: ‘. . . [I]t is 
important to make these world views visible in the debate as they have an 
important place in shaping the choices made about ethical issues raised by 
genetic modification.’67  In a short and inadequate summation, the RCGM 
discussed Te Ao Maori (the traditional Maori worldview), the ecological 
worldview, and the Judeo-Christian worldview. But the RCGM neglected 
to discuss its own operational worldview, the dominant worldview of 
progress and modern science and technology otherwise known as the 
‘technocractic metadiscourse’,68 which has elsewhere been ascribed as 
the discourse of modernity. Either the RCGM was blinkered to its own 
biases, or its worldview as the dominant one in western society was seen 
to be above scrutiny. Instead, the approach of the RCGM was to look 
only for shared values between the divergent worldviews, including that 
of the bioproponents (which we have already identified as belonging to 
modernity). The RCGM stated: ‘. . . in the midst of such diversity, can a 
common core of values be found as a basis for ethical decision-making? 
The Commission debated that question and decided that such a common 
core of values exists.’69 
 The ‘core values’ approach to environmental management has surfaced 
in recent years in both Aotearoa/New Zealand and Australia as a way to 
address conflict among seemingly divergent interests with differing value-
positions, and thus differing ideologies and ethics. Fundamentally, it seeks 
compromise and represents an incrementalist approach that does not overly 
challenge the dominant worldview; the ‘problem’ can be managed within 
the rule boundaries of rational planning set by ‘the system’.70 
 The RCGM listed seven shared values, one of which was ‘sustainability’.71  
In its literal representation, sustainability appears to offer a shared value, 
both the bioproponents’ and biocritics’ submissions citing a dedication 
to this ‘core value’. For example, GM conglomerate Aventis CropScience 
stated: ‘In Aventis, our challenge is life and we are driven by the global 
needs for food safety, sustainability, and a cleaner environment. When we 
look to the big picture, we understand that biotechnology and GM foods 
will play a critical role in feeding the world’s population of 9 billion by 
2025.’72  Here, the image of ‘sustainability’ combines a moral message 
with a scientific one: that is, of producing food for the hungry through 
GE. Yet, the same term acquires a different (and arguably, contradictory) 
meaning in the following passage: ‘Aventis CropScience product stewardship 
activities extend beyond regulatory requirements in our efforts to manage 
the sustainability of our products in the environment.’73  This suggests that 
‘sustainability’ means maintaining the market for Aventis GE products. The 
Judeo-Christian anthropocentric metaphor of ‘stewardship’ for, or ‘wise 
New Zealand’s Royal Commission on Genetic Modification
55
management’ of, the biophysical environment is thus extended to Aventis 
products. The company will even ‘extend beyond regulatory requirements’ 
to achieve this goal. An image of ‘biotechnology as benefactor of society 
and environment’ is thus portrayed. Such rhetorical use of imagery merges 
the concept of sustainability with that of the mythologised grammar of 
biospeak, the biotechnology discourse.74 
 By way of contrast, the environmental group Nelson GE-Free Awareness 
refuted that bioproponents were valuing sustainability in any meaningful way. 
From its perspective, ‘[g]enetic engineering is all about experiment and has 
nothing to do with an effective sustainable future’.75  Instead, Nelson GE–Free 
Awareness’ view was that: ‘. . . sustainable systems are those promoted by 
organics, and that these produce food in a safe and environmentally sensitive 
way which benefits the entire ecosystem’.76 
 Thus, for GE proponents, sustainability means using GE. But, for 
environmentalists, sustainability is threatened by GE and is instead achieved 
by organics. It may be unfair to suggest that the RCGM overlooked the 
different rhetorical landscapes portrayed in these divergent perspectives, but 
the worldview behind the two views is clearly very different. As the RCGM 
ambiguously stated, ‘. . . there are widespread differences of view on how 
to give effect to shared view’.77  Despite this finding, and global consensus 
about the well-known lack of definitional rigour of the term ‘sustainability’,78  
as well as the political intent of marginalising radical environmental thought 
through the popularisation of the concept,79  the Commission identified 
‘sustainability’ as a core value. Perhaps the Commissioners were not well 
versed in the field of environmental politics. Again this would highlight the 
absence of adequate representation for the environmental community in the 
RCGM.
 The set of core values is essential to the GM decision-making framework 
of the proposed Bioethics Council. As the RCGM stated: ‘In the absence of 
an effective framework for ethical decision making, decisions about the use of 
biotechnology will be made by default. It is vital that the Bioethics Council 
provide continuing consultation and active choice, allowing developments 
in biotechnology to be based on the values we hold in common.’80  In 
other words, without ‘an effective framework for ethical decision making’, 
decisions will likely be made according to the status quo. However, if 
values in common can be negotiated successfully, the Council can develop 
GE according to these values. The apparent emphasis is that GE should 
develop; it is just a matter of achieving the right balance of values and 
ethics, deliberated upon by a ‘governing’ Bioethics Council.
 Thus, the overall effect of adopting a core values process to determine 
assessment procedures for GE to develop not only presupposed support for 
GE (which was in direct contradiction to the clear opposition to GE by the 
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vast majority of submissions), but also clearly and effectively sidestepped 
the central issue of power (structures of knowing and meaning) inherent 
within clearly contesting worldviews. In doing this, and in not simultaneously 
reflecting upon and addressing the established modes of knowing and 
reasoning of the modernist worldview, within which it was defined, the effect 
of the RCGM was to silence much of the substance of environmentalist 
arguments about genetic engineering. In short, the outcome was that the 
RCGM affected an empowering conduit to genetic engineering interests, 
and a disempowering one to those who contested GE.
 In its submission to the RCGM, Friends of the Earth (FoE) had actually 
expressed a fear of such a situation developing. Describing the difficulties 
FoE perceived in attempting to explain arguments within an alternative 
worldview to the Commission, the environmental group stated: ‘We are 
concerned about the communication and evaluation problems which are 
bound to occur when competing claims and recommendations arise from 
competing paradigms and worldviews. This is a matter of great importance 
to us because, in section A(1), our recommendation that the first (organic) 
option be adopted is based on an emerging ecological worldview that is 
radically different from the worldview of scientific orthodoxy.’81 
Conclusions
In recommending an overly favourable outcome for the development of 
genetic engineering in Aotearoa/New Zealand, the Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification expressed preferences contradictory to the majority 
of the submissions received, as well as to those of broader society. The 
Commission, widely perceived a priori as a conduit to support the wishes 
of the public majority, instead effected a disempowerment of this majority. 
Why was this so? To explore this question, we applied a multi-dimensional 
framework of discourse analysis to the submission process of the RCGM. 
This found that the social context of the RCGM was embedded within 
hegemonic modernist knowledge/power systems and forms of reasoning. 
These served to contextualise and frame the value positions and points of 
reference for investigating genetic engineering. The effect was to advantage 
genetic engineering interests.
 To frame its deliberations, the RCGM adopted a submission template design 
and process determined by the epistemology of modernity—a reductionist 
philosophical and methodological approach. This disadvantaged holistic 
approaches, which tend to be adopted by deep or radical environmentalists, 
or those challenging modernity. This reductionist approach was facilitated 
by the rules of passage or negotiation of the submission process set by 
the Commission. These rules constrained the ability of those contesting 
GM to express their views within their worldviews, and then to have them 
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considered according to those frames of reference. Overall, the effect of the 
discursive process ruled by ‘stand alone’ conventions enforced the rational/
public: romantic/private discourse split of modernity and preferenced rational 
answers, particularly those of modern science and industry. Non-science 
or romantic based concerns about environmental issues of GM tended to 
be disqualified through compromisation and thus trivialisation of their 
substance.
 Environmental groups were further disadvantaged by the Commission’s 
working document format, which compressed a diverse and intra-contestational 
range of environmental groups’ objections to GE into a generalised summary. 
This further distorted, compromised and misrepresented the ‘rich mosaic’ 
of environmentalist discourses. Another compounding problem was that 
although the Commission made a concession by recognising the importance 
of making alternative worldviews visible in the debate, it failed to question 
its own worldview as both a valid framework for decision-making, and as a 
defining cause of environmental problems. This further acted to disempower 
opposition to genetic engineering. The final problem, and perhaps the 
defining one, was that the Commission proposed a bioethics decision-making 
process as the best avenue for the resolution of problems concerning GM. 
This redefined the central issue for GM from being one of outright majority 
opposition to GM to one of getting the ‘right’ balance of values and ethics 
by which to develop GM.
 The outcome of New Zealand’s Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
thus reinforced the social and cultural power of modernist ideals, advantaged 
genetic engineering interests, disadvantaged environmental groups contesting 
hegemony, failed to adequately address the serious second modernity risks 
posed by genetic engineering, and acted to absorb public dissent to genetic 
engineering. Not only does this highlight that modernity and technoscience 
culture are recalcitrant to challenge but also that genetic experimentation 
is set to continue in Aotearoa/New Zealand against the tide of public 
opinion.
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